It is a historic turn of events that the United States, Europe’s protector, is led for the second time by a hostile Trump. The president, who has won two terms, already harbored a grudge against his grandfather’s homeland during his first term. Trump believes that Europeans, especially Germans, are shrewd parasites who are protected by the United States while destroying American industry through exports. Trump’s return to power marks the end of the era of transatlanticism in German foreign policy, an era in which German governments, regardless of which party was in power, took it for granted that an alliance with the United States would ensure Germany’s security and prosperity. At the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany, transatlanticism was the standard position of all major foreign policymakers, as the United States played a crucial role in the return of this notoriously defeated country to the international community. Now, it is unclear what will replace this transatlantic orientation, whether it will be a commitment to increasing European independence, a new nationalism, or coordination with Eurasian powers Russia and China? All of this means more uncertainty. First, the growing drift between the two sides of the Atlantic must be addressed. When Trump won the first election in 2016, the “America First” orientation could be seen as an episode. But Trump’s re-election suggests that Biden’s hustle for Europe is the deviation from the track, and the “continental drift” between the United States and Europe continues. This did not start with Trump, and it will not end with his resignation. Transatlanticists have long had a hard time. For years, German leftists have criticized the transatlantic network of relations such as the Atlantic Bridge Institute, the German Marshall Fund, the Atlantic Council and the annual Munich Security Conference as a tool for the Pentagon, the military-industrial complex and large companies to exert influence on Germany. The collapse of interventionism after September 11, 2001, made Germany’s pro-American tendencies controversial. At the time, there was an idea that almost became a cliché: Germany had to get rid of the United States, the powerful godfather. But then there was an unexpected turn: the godfather turned around and left. Obama announced a “pivot to Asia” – a new strategic positioning against rival China. His successor Trump declared NATO “obsolete”. In 2017, Merkel, a transatlanticist to the core, expressed an anxious foreboding in soothing terms: “The era of our total dependence on others is, to a certain extent, over.” The desire to break free from the American yoke was outweighed by the fear that Germany might soon be left alone in the Western alliance. Meanwhile, the Atlantic Alliance’s founding members were succumbing to isolationism and nationalism under the slogans of “America First” and “Brexit.” Russia’s war on Ukraine revealed the depth of Europe’s dependence on the United States. Without the United States’ lead in aid, Ukraine could hardly survive. The question is no longer whether Germany should break away from the United States, but whether and how to keep the Americans in Europe. Scholz’s famous “turn of the times” speech was essentially an attempt to keep the United States. The German chancellor hastened to clear away any suspicion that Germany was a free rider. Scholz, a late embracing of transatlanticism, was extremely enthusiastic. He coordinated with the White House before making major decisions, such as the supply of main battle tanks to Ukraine. He sometimes actually hid behind Biden. There are deeper reasons for this that go far beyond personal affection. Since the most dangerous period of the Cold War (the two Berlin crises in 1948 and 1958), Germany’s dependence on the United States has never been so obvious as in the face of the Russian nuclear threat. The Russian threat has made the Germans realize again that the deterrent power of the United States is the “life insurance” of German security policy. Now, after the CDU’s victory, the task of formulating another foreign policy approach falls on Merz, who will become the German Chancellor. But just as Scholz was anti-American in his early years and later pro-American, this arrangement is also ironic for Merz. Merz has always regarded himself as a transatlanticist. He worked for the American investment company BlackRock and served as chairman of the Atlantic Bridge Association for many years. Now, Merz, a friend of the United States, has to formulate another set of foreign policies for Germany to deal with the extreme situation that the United States is not a well-intentioned partner, or even an opponent.
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